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IN A LETTER TO Swiss pastor Oskar Pfister in 1918, Sigmund Freud wrote, 
"Why did none of the devout create psychoanalysis? Why did it have to wait for 
a completely godless Jew?" Casually denying both Freud's Judaism and his 
"godlessness," Pfister replied, "A better Christian there never was!" 
Like the nineteenth-century "quest for the historical Jesus," the recent quest 
for the historical Freud has proven remarkable in the variety and diversity of its 
formulations. The self-proclaimed "godless Jew" becomes, in Peter Gay's re-
cent volume of that title, more godless than Jewish. Paul Vitz, following 
Pfister's lead in claiming Freud for Christianity, makes him neither godless nor 
Jewish. Joachim Scharfenberg finds a theological Freud seeking faith. Julia 
Kristeva finds a post-atheistic Freud. Eli Sagan finds a troubled moralist. 
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The recent scholarship on Freud is guilty of the same kind of ideological pro-
jection as that uncovered by Albert Schweitzer in his 1906 expos~ of the as-
sumptions underlying the "historical Jesus" scholarship: the search for the 
religious Freud evinces a search for an atheist, Christian, or Jew who mirrors 
the personal and intellectual assumptions of the seeker. Ironically, of the three 
issues emerging as central concerns in recent literature on Freud-Jewishness, 
ethics, and gender-Jewishness and ethics were also the focus of heated debate 
among nineteenth-century Biblical scholars. 
Dennis Klein (1985) has functioned as the Schweitzer of Freud scholarship 
in revealing the ideologies beneath the debate over Freud's Jewishness. Many 
biographers, even those with admirable intentions, have either denied or under-
estimated the psychoanalytic movement's Jewish context and content. Desiring 
to emphasize the universal truths discovered by Freud, Ernest Jones, Freud's 
"official" biographer and the first non-Jew in Freud's inner circle, down played 
Freud's Jewish identity. Alternately, a tradition of overestimation of Freud's 
Jewish identity has attempted either to dismiss psychoanalysis as merely a Jew-
ish crypto-science or to foster Jewish interests by demonstrating the creative 
impact of Jews on modem life. Each of these positions is prone to ideological 
excess. Each is ahistorical, ignoring both the changing political and religious 
context of Freud's life and the shifting meaning of Judaism for him (Klein, 
1985, xii). 
Freud was, throughout his life, a "godless Jew," but both his godlessness and 
his Jewishness took on different meanings in different circumstances. These 
changes are particularly evident during the fonnative decades of his youth and 
the period of his discovery of psychoanalysis. A source of shame and suffering 
prior to 1880, his Jewishness meant a proudly held sectarian and ethnic identity 
in the late 1880s and an ethical universalism and a finn foundation of psycho-
analysis in the 1890s. Jewishness never, however, meant belief in God. Freud's 
godlessness is a less variable concept, but it, too, is more nuanced than most bi-
ographers make it. 
The question of Freud's personal religious identity must be seen against the 
background of Austrian politics. Born in 1856, Freud was an Eastern European 
Jew whose family moved to Vienna in 1859 in a climate of political liberalism 
and toleration. The liberalism of the 1860s and 70s resulted in an unprece-
dented integration of Jews into Austrian culture. As a youth, Freud embraced 
Austrian assimilationism and Gennan nationalism, even going so far as to 
change his name from the Jewish Sigismund to the more Gennanic Sigmund. 
Freud's childhood home was not atypical among Jewish families in liberal 
Austria. Assimilated to the cosmopolitan culture of Vienna, the family spoke 
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German and ignored such observances as the Sabbath. As a youth, Freud read 
the Old Testament avidly, but he saw the Bible as a hwnanitarian and ethical 
docmnent, not as a sacred text. His assimilated Judaism was essentially nonre-
ligious. As a university student influenced by the rationalism and determinism 
of Helmholtz, Darwin, and Briicke, he defined himself as an atheistic, scientific 
materialist. 
However, letters between Freud and his friend Silberstein reveal the com-
plexity of Freud's "godlessness" at this time. In the 1870s Freud took five 
courses at the University of Vienna from the Catholic philosopher Franz 
Brentano, whose sophisticated argmnents for the existence of God influenced 
him deeply. A letter to Silberstein in 1875 says, "At the moment I am no longer 
a materialist but not yet a theist .... In the course of several semesters I mean to 
become thoroughly acquainted with (Brentano's) philosophy and until then to 
reserve judgment on it as well as to hold off a decision between theism and ma-
terialism" (McGrath, 1986, 118). Freud's 1927 work, The Future of an Illusion, 
represents a return to his debates with Brentano. 
In the 1880s the decades of Austrian liberalism came to an end in a massive 
political shift marked by the end of assimilationism and a sharp rise in anti-
Semitism. These were years of profound disillusionment and moral outrage for 
Freud,leading to a defensive, defiant Jewishness, which, by the mid 1880s, bad 
matured to a Jewish pride that was more than defensive. 
But Freud remained firmly opposed to religious belief and ritual. His opposi-
tion to ritual even led him to consider conversion to Protestantism in order to 
have a civil wedding and thereby avoid an orthodox Jewish ceremony. If the 
1870s had represented a period of godless, assimilated Jewishness for Freud, by 
the end of the 1880s Freud was a godless Jew in another sense: his still atheistic 
Jewishness was an expression of ethnic pride. 
Struggling to establish his professional career amidst the continuing anti-
Semitism of the 1890s led to further developments in Freud's Jewish identity. 
He joined B 'nai B 'rith in 1897. In both ideology and membership this group 
prefigured the analytic circle Freud founded in 1902. Common to both was a 
sense of a universalist, ethical mission based on Jewish identity. Both groups 
defined their Jewishness as allegiance to the ideals of progress, humanitarian-
ism, and ethical universalism. With a degree of missionary fervor Freud ex-
pressed the view that Jewish consciousness imparted to psychoanalysis "a 
dynamism aimed at benefiting all mankind" (Klein, 1985, 148). 
By 1908, however, Freud desired to broaden the appeal oflhe psychoanalytic 
movement. He wrote of the danger of the movement's becoming a "Jewish Na-
tional Affair," and he argued in 1910 that "it is absolutely essential that I should 
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form ties in the world of general science" (Klein, 94). But he never completely 
abandoned his sense of psychoanalysis as a "Jewish science" or his sense of 
identity with Moses. In the preface to the Hebrew translation of Totem and 
Taboo, he said, for example, "If the question were put to (me): 'Since you have 
abandoned all these common characteristics of your countrymen, what is there 
left to you that is Jewish?' I would reply: 'A very great deal, and probably its 
very essence'" (in McGrath, 1988, 29). 
Letters and accounts of private conversations reveal a continuing fascination 
with the ideas of theism, God, and the occult. Freud's published writings are 
rife with the playful use of religious language and metaphor: he speaks, for ex-
ample of "our God Logos" and of the "Heavenly Powers." Clearly, his godless-
ness was never monolithic. Publicly, however, Freud always remained a 
godless Jew: atheistic i~ terms of belief and Jewish in terms of ethnic identity 
and ethical universalism. 
In A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis Peter 
Gay fails to differentiate the ethnic, ethical, and theistic aspects of Judaism. Lo-
cating Freud entirely in the tradition of the secular Enlightenment thinkers, he 
affirms Freud's atheism but denies his Jewishness. In Sigmund Freud's Chris-
tian Unconscious Paul Vitz denies both Freud's atheism and his Jewishness. 
There is little that can be said in favor of Vitz's book. Vitz has gathered a 
massive collection of gossip, speculations, and misinterpretations. His thesis is 
that Freud had a lifelong attraction to Christianity and deeply desired to be bap-
tized. He develops this thesis by seeking out references to God, the Bible, 
Rome, and Christian authors or artists in Freud's letters and published works. 
Any such reference functions as proof of Freud's putative desire for baptism. 
Alternately, references to the Devil, Hell, and the Anti-Christ reveal Freud's 
deep ambivalence about Christianity, which in turn "proves" his (repressed) at-
traction toil. 
V itz offers little acknowledgment of the historical context which made as-
similation attractive in the 1870s and impossible later; nor is there any ac-
knowledgment of the anti-Semitism Freud faced throughout his life. Freud's 
1870s assimilationism is interpreted as a desire to convert to Christianity (86) 
rather· than a response to Austrian liberalism. His thought of converting to Prot-
estantism in order to have a civil rather than religious wedding ceremony is in-
terpreted not as anti-ritualistic but as pro-Christian (94). Freud's 1897 dream 
series about laying siege to Rome is interpreted by Vitz as a literal desire for 
Catholic conversion (86). Freud himself saw these dreams as an angry response 
to the increased Catholic and Austrian anti-Semitism of the 1890s. 
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Vitz seeks the source of Freud's personal desire for baptism and his intellec-
tual hostility to religious belief in childhood experiences-particularly in his 
love for the Catholic nanny who had cared for him during his first two and a 
half or three years and in the trauma of her sudden departure. In a scenario 
meant to explain the nanny's departure, Vitz suggests that Freud's mother, 
Amalie, had an affair with Freud's half -brother Philip. The nanny, according to 
Vitz, discovered the lovers and was fired to protect their secret. 
The nanny/mother/lover combination is ubiquitous in Vitz. It is used to ex-
plain not only Freud's atheism but also most of the components of his life and 
theory. Freud's fascination with sexuality and incest is explained as a continua-
tion of childhood curiosity about the Amalie-Philip relationship. Freud's rejec-
tion of the "divine father, is explained as an inevitable result of his loss of 
respect for the personal father betrayed by Amalie and Philip (36). Freud's cri-
tique of religion in The Future of an Illusion is seen as "an expression of his at-
tempt to cope with lost happiness ... [H]e was consciously turning with 
bitterness and anger ... on his nanny and on the ideas so deeply associated with 
her: salvation Christianity, and the Catholic church" (216). Freud's rejection of 
Judaism is caused by the nanny's putative anti-Semitism (103); his "love" of 
Christianity and his fascination with Rome by her Catholicism; his dislike of 
music by the church bells he "might" have heard while in Catholic churches 
with her (117); his choice of the name "Anna" for his daughter by its rhyming 
with "nana, (29). The nanny is even brought out to explain the absence of the 
Virgin Mary in Freud's writings: the nanny was too old to provide a good psy-
chological symbol for the Virgin Mary ( 191 ). 
Vitz discovers "evidence" for these claims through a henneneutics of trans-
parency: anything Freud wrote is self-revelation. All the metapsychological 
writings are disguised autobiography, while the case histories represent materi-
als Freud chose to discuss because they resembled his own life (138). Freud's 
letters and dreams are plundered as well. But even without such "evidence" 
Vitz is unperturbed. He does not hesitate to offer speculations about what Freud 
"probably" experienced or what "might" have happened. Vitz's argument is a 
travesty of scholarly research and methodology, and a paradigmatic example of 
the dangers of psychobiographies that ignore historical and political contexts. 
In a classic ad hominem argument Vitz tries to show that Freud's atheism is a 
pathological and neurotic response to childhood trauma, that Freud's critique of 
religion in general is psychologically determined and erroneous, and that 
Freud's entire theory can be explained away as mere symptom. Vitz remains 
unaware of the irony that his own methodology of psychoanalyzing the psycho-
analyst remains dependent upon the tools he attempts to prove erroneous. 
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Freud's complex identity as a godless Jew is not addressed by Vitz's text. 
Gennan theologian Joachim Scharfenberg and French psychoanalyst Julia 
Kristeva, however, offer more sophisticated analyses of Freud's identity. Both 
contribute to a nuanced understanding of his "godlessness." Scharfenberg's pri-
mary concern is the psychoanalytic critique of religion rather than the personal 
faith of Freud the man. But he, too, seeks to find faith embedded in the atheism 
of psychoanalytic theory. Through a careful examination of Freud's writings on 
delusion he discovers within Freud an acknowledgment that although religion 
may be delusory, it is nevertheless meaningful. By calling religion a delusion, 
Freud implies a homology with other delusory "symptoms": religion functions 
as a "meaningful reaction of the psyche in an attempt to heal itself' (135). Not 
content with finding religion for Freud meaningful but wrong, Scharfenberg 
finds in The Future of an Illusion an acknowledgment that religion actually 
contains a certain historical truth: the historical memory of the primal horde. 
Thus, Scharfenberg argues convincingly, Freud leaves open the possibility for 
the coexistence of faith and the reality principle. Finally, Scharfenberg goes be-
yond Freud's texts to reshape Freud's atheism into faith. He suggests that in his 
lifelong occupation with religious phenomena Freud was searching for "a ma-
ture fom1 of faith that would correspond to the state of psychic maturity for 
which he strived with his patients .. .. a faith that did not distort reality through 
delusion and which ... did not remain bound to an ahistorical metaphysics of 
the soul" (145). 
Kristeva's discussion of psychoanalysis and faith is the most valuable of 
these books under review. Her comments are not biographical but focus on psy-
choanalysis as therapy. By implication, however, she suggests that Freud re-
nounced both faith and atheism. 
In The Future of an Illusion Freud had defined illusion not as an idea which 
is necessarily wrong but as an idea whose source is an unconscious wish. Reli-
gion is illusory: neither provable nor disprovable, it originates in wishes for 
consolation, protection, or eternal life. Although Freud recommends a strenu-
ous, reality-oriented life without the consolation of illusions, Kristeva aims to 
restore illusion to its full therapeutic and epistemological value. She shows that 
analysis leads to a simultaneous renunciation of illusion through a skepticism 
regarding all received knowledge and a resumption of transitory ludic illusions: 
"the function of psychoanalysis is to reawaken the imagination and to pennit il-
lusions to exist." But, she asks, "Does this mean restoring value to religion as 
well? Not altogether" (1987, 18). Her renunciation of both faith and atheism al-
lows Freud his godlessness without locking him into a rigid atheism: "Repres-
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sion can be atheist, atheism is repressive, whereas the experience of psycho-
analysis can lead to renunciation of faith with clear understanding" (26). 
The faith of Freud has emerged as a compelling issue in this recent literature. 
Vitz projects his own Christian fundamentalism onto Freud. The theologian 
Scharfenberg addresses the question carefully but cannot resist making Freud 
into a seeker of faith. Only the psychoanalyst Kristeva honors Freud's godless-
ness. 
Another compelling issue in the recent proliferation of interpretations of 
Freud is that of gender and morality. Eli Sagan in Freud, Women, atul Morality 
criticizes psychoanalytic theory of morality by uncovering logical inconsisten-
cies in Freud's analysis of the superego. These inconsistencies, he suggests, are 
caused by Freud's deep ambivalence toward women and are a direct result of 
pre-Oedipal traumata: Freud suffered, and subsequently repressed, severe 
threats of castration from a pre-Oedipal maternal figure. A voiding any specula-
tion about the nanny. he assumes Freud's mother was the culprit 
Sagan's discussion of the psychoanalytic theory of the superego is well-con-
ceived and carefully argued. He points out that Freud has three kinds of texts on 
morality: cultural texts like Totem and Taboo which offer a hypothetical theory 
of the origins of the moral impulse in civilization; metapsychological texts like 
The Ego and the ld which explain the role of the Oedipus Complex in the devel-
opment of the superego; and case histories like "Little Hans" which graphically 
demonstrate the workings of the Oedipus Complex. Sagan demonstrates the 
contradictions among these texts. While the meta psychological texts argue that 
the renunciation of Oedipal fantasies leads to the resolution of the Oedipus 
Complex and the development of the superego, the case history shows Little 
Hans working through his Oedipal Complex by means of dreanlS which allow 
him to imagine the fulfillment of Oedipal fantasies; and the reconstruction of 
the origins of culture and morality in the primal horde has the sons successfully 
fulfilling their pa"icidalfantasies. 
Sagan sees the metapsychological texts as erroneous, arguing that fantasized 
fulfillment of wishes, rather than renunciation of wishes, allows for moral de-
velopment: "consummation, not renunciation, is the way to psychic health" 
(85). Why, he asks, did Freud reject in his theoretical works a truth that had 
been clearly perceived in the case history and in the myth of cultural origins? 
The inconsistencies, Sagan suggests, are a result of repression and denial of 
pre-Oedipal trauma, a repression which is responsible for his erroneous view of 
morality, his exclusion of women from renunciatory morality, and his misogy-
nist theory of female sexuality. "Freud revenged himself on all women-mothers 
by constructing a theory tltat established their genital and moral equipment as 
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vastly inferior. The theory of morality was a casualty of that unnecessary ven~ 
geance" (84). 
Although Freud's relationship with his father has been carefully examined 
by many scholars, the relationship with his mother remains largely unexplored. 
Freud himself never subjected to analysis his relationship with the strong and 
energetic Amalie. TI1e formative role of Freud's mother in the development of 
the psychoanalytic theory of gender, female sexuality, and morality is an im-
portant question which deserves further investigation. But Sagan's analysis of 
this material remains incomplete. 
Sagan also aspires to a constructive project: he desires to develop a nonsexist 
psychoanalytic theory of moral development. He locates the origins of con-
science in the pre-Oedipal period, thereby removing the misogyny from Freud's 
theory and "correcting" the errors in psychoanalysis. Maternal love and nur-
ture, he suggests, give rise to identification and idealization: these are the 
sources of a relational and egalitarian moral capacity. 
Several problems emerge here. First, Sagan fails to locate his critique in the 
context of the ongoing discourse regarding feminism, psychoanalysis, morality, 
and the pre-Oedipal mother. Neither Nancy Chodorow's analysis of gender de-
velopment and the pre-Oedipal period nor Carol Gilligan's relational theory of 
gender and morality appears in the bibliography. Nor is the work of Juliet 
Mitchell m~ntioned. Mitchell's important text Psychoanalysis and Feminism 
(1974) argues that Freud accurately depicted gender and morality in patriarchal 
cultures. Sagan's failure to address these materials weakens his argument 
Second, current thinkers in the areas of feminism and psychoanalysis have 
furthered Mitchell's analysis by showing the difficulty of separating Freud's 
misogyny from his theory. Judith Van Herik (1982) has demonstrated that 
Freud's misogyny is structurally embedded in the theory itself: femininity and 
masculinity function as primary structural foundations of psychoanalysis, 
working as logical equivalents to wish fulfillment and renunciation, illusion 
and reason. If Van Herik is right, misogyny cannot be so easily lifted from psy-
choanalysis: morality is renunciatory and masculine in psychoanalytic theory; 
it cannot be restructured as fulfilling and feminine. 
Third, Sagan misconceives the pre-Oedipal mother-child relation. While he 
implies that the pre-Oedipal period constitutes a purely feminine realm prior to 
language and culture, giving rise to true morality. Kristeva's analysis of faith, 
and morality in In The Beginning was Love shows the error of Sagan's con-
stnJction. Kristeva has written other texts which address more specifically the 
question of cultural misogyny. the pre-Oedipal relationship, and feminist the-
ory (1982. 1986. 1987)./n the Beginning was Love has a different focus: it 
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seeks homologies between the experience of religious faith and the experience 
of the psychoanalytic transference relationship. But Kristeva's well-known 
analysis of gender and culture is present, if not explicit, throughout her text 
Kristeva opposes Sagan's view in an oblique but fundamental way, avoiding 
the temptation to seek the origins of faith, morality, and love in a simplistic 
analysis of pre-Oedipal mothering. She speaks of the origins of faith in the ex-
perience of divine lov~. describing faith as a primary identification with a lov-
ing and protective agency. This protective agency however, is not only 
maternal but, through language and culture, paternal and symbolic as well. 
Similarly, the transference relationship is not a recreation of maternal nurture 
but a paternal (linguistic, symbolic) relationship of dialogue and exchange 
based on love: "Overcoming the notion of irremediable separation, Western 
man ... reestablishes a continuity or fusion with an Other that is no longer sub-
stantial and maternal but symbolic and paternaf' (24, emphasis mine). 
Kristeva reminds us that St. Augustine compared Christian faith in God with 
the infant's relation to its mother's breast. Her interpretation of this text reveals 
her understanding of the transformation of maternal imagery into the paternal 
symbolic structures of Christianity: "What we have here is fusion with a breast 
that is, to be sure, succoring, nourishing,loving, protective, but transposed from 
mother's body to an invisible agency located in another world" (24). The impli-
cations of Kristeva's argument are powerful. First, contra Sagan, there is no 
purely feminine, pre-Oedipal basis of morality: morality is inevitably shaped, 
through language, by patriarchal discourse. Second, Freud's androcentrism is 
not defensive, as Sagan would have it, but rather an accurate perception of the 
embeddedness of the paternal in culture. 
Kristeva speaks from a feminist position dramatically different from 
Sagan's. Their differences epitomize current debates between French and 
American feminists. With the finest of intentions, American feminists like 
Sagan criticize sexism and promote egalitarian visions of human interaction. 
Kristeva and other French feminists, however, maintain that the American posi-
tion ignores the subtlety of the cultural construction of gender. While Kristeva 
is a very conscious participant in this discourse, Sagan is unaware not only of 
the French feminist perspective but also of the views of the American feminists 
who share his vision. 
Kristeva 's evocative comments on ethics also avoid the reductionism of 
Sagan's approach. Sagan argues not only that true conscience originates in the 
pre-Oedipal relationship but also that Freud's theory of superego morality is es-
sentially immoral. While Freud has often been attacked for immorality, the 
standard critique accuses him of an antinomian undermining of social and sex-
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ual norms. Sagan's critique is based on the opposite set of asswnptions: social 
and sexual norms are often inunoral, and Freud's notion of the social construc-
tion of the superego offers no vantage point from which to criticize culturally 
sanctioned injustice. Kristeva, by contrast, finds in Freud a truly ethical posi-
tion. Morality in psychoanalytic theory is based on a free engagement with the 
Other: "only the meaning that my desire may have for another, and hence for 
me, can control its expansion, hence serve as the unique if tenuous basis of a 
morality" (63). This moral engagement with the Other comes about through 
analysis itself: "The real end of analysis occurs when a certain playfulness of 
spirit returns . . . . I am indeed alone, like no other person. Knowing this, I can 
also play for real, for keeps, at fonning bonds, creating communities, helping 
others, loving, losing" (51). In Kristeva' s last words in this text, psychoanalysis 
becomes the privileged medium of meaning and morality: "psychoanalysis ... 
is the modest if tenacious antidote to nihilism . . . [but, Kristeva asks] for bow 
long" (63). Unlike Sagan's oppositional critique of Freud, Kristeva offers a 
subtle and lyrical homage to Freud, finding an affirmation of relational morality 
both in Freud's texts and in the analytic situation. 
Scharfenberg, in effect, joins Kristeva in defending Freud against Sagan's 
accusation. Freud does challenge traditional morality, Scharfenberg suggests, 
by demanding "that ethical decision be based on insight" rather than obedience 
to authority (130). The resolution to the debates over Freud's ethics lies in the 
psychoanalytic discussion of the freedom that comes about through the trans-
ference relationship: dialogue in analysis becomes "the source of ethical deci-
sion, and ethics itself would be stripped of its compelling, enslaving, taboo 
character and be freed instead to become a kind of traffic code for interaction 
with other people" (132). This ethical freedom transcends the ahistorical "repe-
tition compulsion," moving toward the possibility of health, change, and love. 
The analyses of Kristeva and Scharfenberg serve to exonerate Freud from 
Sagan's insistence that the superego is immoral. Sagan himself admits toward 
the end of his book (although only in a footnote) that Freud's late writings on 
Eros "transform the superego into a truly moral instrument" (215). 
Sagan's demonstration of inconsistencies in Freud's analysis of Oedipal res-
olution and superego function remains an important contribution to the psycho-
analytic literature. Provocative, but incompletely developed, are his 
suggestions regarding Freud's mother and her influence on his theories. Most 
problematic are his attack on psychoanalysis as inunoral and his naive con-
struction of a pre-Oedipal source of morality. 
Scharfenberg and Kristeva address two topics which are not concerns of ei-
ther Sagan or Vitz: language and love. Their conunents must be placed in the 
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context of their books. Written two decades ago in 1%8, Scharfenberg's book 
was only recently translated from the German. Although somewhat dated, it 
nevertheless offers a significant analysis of the psychoanalytic critique of reli-
gion. Urging theologians to take Freud seriously, Scharfenberg constructs three 
major argmnents. First, Freud's critique leads not to a dissolution of faith but to 
a purification of inauthentic elements from faith. Second, Freud's writings on 
therapy and culture contain an implicit vision of mature faith. Third, Freud's 
analysis of illness and healing offers a theory of language with important impli-
cations for theology. 
An informative chapter on theological reactions to Freud surveys the Euro-
pean literature. Scharfenberg enumerates both theologians who reacted with 
hostility to Freud's work and theologians like Paul Tillich and Oskar PCister, 
who embraced psychoanalysis. But his goal is to move beyond both the resis-
tance to Freud and the "uncritical idealization or adaptation of Freud by theolo-
gians" toward a "critical interaction" (24) where the practice of psychoanalytic 
therapy can shape a fresh understanding of religion and theology. 
Scharfenberg is most original in his discussion of Freud's theory of lan-
guage. He juxtaposes the linguistic nature of diagnosis and cure in Freud with 
the linguistic nature of hermeneutics and proclamation in theology. For Freud, 
language is the source of illness: the hysterical symptom is a literalization of a 
body-based linguistic "organ language." It is also the basis of healing: psycho-
analysis is "the talking cure." Language and interpretation are interpersonal: 
meaning emerges through transference and countertransference. Language in 
therapy leads to a freedom "beyond the ahistorical entrapment in the compul-
sion to repeat, into a history-making and liberating capacity to love." Thus lan-
guage in analysis leads to the freedom to love. This psychoanalytic notion of 
language, Scharfenberg argues, is deeply relevant to the theological location of 
proclamation and revelation in language: "NoU1ing is real until it can be made 
present by putting it into language and thus reality can be regarded as only a 
category of language .... In the realm of theology. hermeneutics is the grammar 
of faith" (1 03 ). Scharfenberg thus provocatively explores territories of pro-
found value for theology. 
This otherwise fine book is flawed by 0. C. Dean Jr.'s poor translation and 
irresponsible editorial policy. In order to avoid "discouraging the prospective 
reader" (viii), Dean, a Methodist minister in Georgia, has shortened the text and 
bibliography and omitted most of the German footnotes. Nevertheless, U1e book 
remains a useful text on the theological response to Freud's critique of religion, 
offering an articulate portrayal of Christian faith deepened by the psychoana-
lytic critique. 
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Julia Kristeva's In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith grew 
out of a series of lectures delivered to students at a Catholic school inVer-
sailles. In this slender volume Kristeva develops an extension of her earlier 
work Tales of Love. A wide-ranging examination of love as the root of all narra-
tives, Tales included an examination of the amorous dialogue which makes up 
transference and countertransference in analysis. In the Beginning furthers this 
project, turning specifically to the question of love as the common ground of 
psychoanalytic therapy and religious faith. 
Jacques Lacan is mentioned only twice, but his presence is ubiquitous. 
Kristeva is constantly in dialogue with him over the question of the human sub-
ject, the nature of otl1emess, and tile question of language and affect. Her loca-
tion of affect (the "semiotic") at the center of the unconscious represents a 
subtle departure from La can 's insistence on the centrality of language (the 
"symbolic'') in the unconscious. 
The connections Kristeva weaves among language, affect, and body become 
the context for a discussion of the process of interaction in analytic dialogue, 
the transfonnations made possible through successful analysis, and the psycho-
logical aptness of the central symbols of Christianity. She notes that the "mobi-
lization of two people's minds and bodies by the sole agency of the words that 
pass between them sheds light on Freud's famous remark ... that the founda-
tion of the cure is 'Our God Logos'." It also recalls the words of the gospels, 'In 
the beginning was the Word' and 'God is love'." 
In a delightful analysis of the central symbols of Christianity's Credo, she 
suggests that Christianity embodies the basic fantasies encountered every day 
in the psychic lives of patients: "The alnlighty father? Patients miss one, want 
one, or suffer from one .... More than any other religion, Christianity has un-
raveled the symbolic and physical importance of the patemal function in human 
life .... Consubstantiality with the father and symbolic identification with his 
name? Patients aspire to nothing else .... A virgin mother? We want our moth-
ers to be virgins so that we can love them better or allow ourselves to be loved 
by them without fear of rival. ... The scandal of the cross .... Christianity sup-
plies images for even the fissures in our secret and fundamental logic. How can 
we not believe?" ( 40-42). She likens Christianity to psychoanalysis. With the 
Credo Christians "have already begun the analytic process. Is it not true that 
analysis begins with something comparable to faith, namely transferential 
love?" (52). 
Yet Kristeva conunends neither faith nor atheism. Analysis favors neither a 
stoic world comprised of "lonely men and women without ties to one another 
and without religion" nor a world of illusory fai~. Analysis tenninates beyond 
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the need for an illusory faith and beyond the repression of faith in atheism. It 
terminates with a desire to question all received truths, a capacity for play, and 
a joyous engagement with others. 
While the transferentiallanguage of psychoanalysis is the mediwn of ethics, 
meaning, and freedom for both Kristeva and Scharfenberg, love functions dif-
ferently for the two authors. Love is the telos of Scharfenberg's analysis, but for 
Kristeva love is the beginning, the context which makes possible both therapeu-
tic analysis and religious faith. Kristeva 's telos is the post-analytic position, 
where "gravity becomes frivolity and retains its memory of suffering and con-
tinues its search for truth in the joy of perpetually making a new beginning" 
(52). Kristeva 's post-analytic "new beginning," however, evokes the pre-ana-
lytic beginning: in the beginning was love, and in the beginning was the word. 
Love and language, for Kristeva, are both the beginning and the end of analysis. 
Among the first recipients of the Goethe Prize for literature were Albert 
Schweitzer in 1928 and Sigmund Freud in 1930. A generation earlier 
Schweitzer had sounded the death knell for naively doctrinaire biographies of 
Jesus. But just as lives of the historical Jesus would again proliferate by the late 
twentieth century, so would lives of the religious Freud, in spite of the fact that 
Freud had tried several times to obstruct his future biographers by burning let-
ters and docwnents. 
If Schweitzer exposed the power of ideologies to generate misperceptions, 
Freud exposed the power of unconscious wishes. Of the texts and authors ex-
amined here, Vitz, Sagan. and Scharfenberg fail to avoid ideologically and un-
consciously motivated misperceptions in the reconstruction of their subject. 
The Christian fundamentalist Vitz baptizes Freud. The feminist Sagan slays the 
misogynist Freud and sculpts an egalitarian psychoanalysis. The Enlightenment 
historian Gay denies the significance of Freud's Jewishness. While the theolo-
gian Scharfenberg constructs a productive dialogue between psychoanalysis 
and theology, he reshapes Freud into an ersatz Christian. Only Kristeva avoids 
a mythic reconstruction of her subject. She allows Freud to remain a godless 
Jew, suggestively explores the moral and amorous vision he generated in his 
creation of psychoanalysis, and acknowledges the paternal and "symbolic" as 
well as "semiotic" shaping of aiTect in Western culture. 
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